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An Illustration of the Intersection of Social Science 
and the Law: The Legal Rights of Adolescents to 
Make Medical Decisions 
 
Murray Levine,* Leah Wallach,** 




The following are excerpts of Chapter 1: Social Science and 
Psychological Influences in Law and Chapter 14: The Right of Adolescents 
to Make Significant Medical Decisions—The Abortion Example from the 
forthcoming textbook, Psychological Problems, Social Issues, and the 
Law.1 The authors wrote the textbook, in part, to address the question: 
“When law and psychology intersect, can and how do we fully consider the 
potential ramifications of the social science beyond the confines of this one 
case?”2 The editors of the Hastings Women’s Law Journal selected and 
adapted the ensuing passages of the authors’ work as an illustration of 
answering that question within a specific context. The passages from 
Chapter 1, in Section I of this Article, demonstrate that while social science 
and the law share characteristics and the law often relies on social science, 
the two fields are almost innately at odds. The passages from Chapter 14, 
in Sections II and III of this Article, exemplify how this dynamic plays out 
in a controversial area of both law and social science. The original content 
has not been changed but has been reformatted for law review publication 
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I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES 
IN LAW 
 
A. LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: SIBLINGS OR DISTANTLY RELATED 
COUSINS? 
 
Understanding the extent to which law and social science can influence 
one another requires that we understand the ways they overlap and differ. 
Law and social science share some important characteristics. At a basic 
level, both are concerned with human behavior. Both law and social 
science change as society changes and as knowledge increases. However, 
they differ in how they understand and absorb change. 
Social scientists’ goal is new knowledge; they try to be skeptical, 
exploratory, and open to changing ideas based on new information. In 
psychology, conclusions and theories are subjected to criticism and 
challenge through peer review and published criticism by other scientists. 
Law’s movement is necessarily gradual. One of law’s functions is to ensure 
social stability. The legal system has a role in maintaining a sense of 
cultural identity and continuity while slowly incorporating cultural 
innovation and changing values. 
The contrast between law’s conservative nature and social science’s 
willingness to experiment can be problematic when social science 
professionals interact with courts. For social scientists and mental health 
professionals, being wrong is part of the trial-and-error process of learning. 
To judges and lawyers, this learning process may seem like unreliability. 
Trial courts seek to find out the truth about past events that are the 
subject of a specific dispute, then make a specific decision relatively 
quickly with whatever knowledge they have. When the legal process 
arrives at an erroneous conclusion, an injustice may be done. Justice Harry 
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Blackmun once characterized the difference in these terms: 
 
The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging 
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are 
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an 
advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, 
however, in the project of reaching a quick, final and binding legal 
judgment—often of great consequence—about a particular set of 
events in the past.3 
 
Second, law and psychology evaluate behavior differently. 
Psychologists tend to see the behaviors, abilities, and responsibilities of 
different people as a continuum and as varying in the same person with 
different situations. They generally present conclusions in probabilistic 
terms, not as absolutes. The legal system often requires that people or 
behaviors be placed in distinct categories: insane or not, dangerous or not, 
negligent or not, guilty or not. 
Third, psychologists and judges may also approach issues differently at 
the legislative (policy) level. These differences may lead to 
misunderstandings between the two groups—and often disappointment for 
social scientists who sometimes feel that courts do not give their work the 
weight it deserves. One of the functions of social scientists is to empirically 
test conventional assumptions about human nature. Policy makers are not 
always interested in or willing to credit research questioning common sense 
or community beliefs.4 They may feel it is a community’s right to 
implement policies that reflect its deeply held beliefs. 
Finally, judges have a complex job. Part of that job is to uphold or 
express the symbols of society’s basic values.5 Even when they are 
interested in empirical research bearing on a decision, data about the 
assumptions or outcomes of a policy will comprise only one of their 
considerations. Judges must consider legal rights and duties, the fairness of 
procedures, the appropriate assignment of power and authority, and legal 
precedent. Their reasoning determines the conclusions they draw from 
research facts or whether they consider research at all. 
 
B. LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 
 
Today, psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, and other social scientists participate both directly and 
indirectly in all three branches of government and influence policy at every 
 
 3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 4. See Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585 
(1999). 
 5. See David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding: Exploring the 
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation. 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991). 
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level.6 Clinical forensic (“belonging to courts of justice”)7 practice in 
general, and subspecialties in criminal and family law, have expanded 
greatly as well. Mental health professionals now contribute to the day-to-
day administration of justice. They serve the courts as expert witnesses, and 
provide psychological services to the police and correctional systems. 
Family and juvenile courts work routinely with allied social service 
agencies. Clinical, cognitive, developmental, and social psychologists do 
the basic research on which expert opinion is grounded. Research by 
cognitive and social psychologists into issues such as the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony, false confession, juror biases, and juror decision 
making also influences the trial process, directly through expert testimony, 
and indirectly by suggesting ways judges and legislators may develop 
better procedures. Social scientists and legal scholars now quickly examine 
the legal implications of new developments in psychology and other social 
sciences. 
 
II. THE RIGHT OF ADOLESCENTS TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT 
MEDICAL DECISIONS: THE ABORTION EXAMPLE 
 
The abortion controversy is among the most intense policy debates in 
contemporary society and presents an example of the interplay between law 
and psychology. On one end of the debate are those who believe that 
human life begins at the moment of conception. They say that a fetus of 
any gestational age is entitled to the same legal protections as a newborn 
child. To them, abortion is murder; for some, this is true even if the 
procedure is done to save the mother’s life. On the other end of the debate 
are those who believe that life begins at birth, and that women should have 
the option of aborting a fetus as a matter of their autonomy. There are many 
views in between these poles, as well. 
Many states have promulgated laws affecting adolescents, and courts 
have allowed greater limitations to be placed on adolescents than on adult 
rights to privacy and choice. Adolescent pregnancy touches on critically 
important and emotion-laden topics—adolescent sexuality, the meaning of 
motherhood to a woman’s life, and the authority of families to make 
decisions for their children. 
 
A. ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY  
 
The rates of pregnancies for teenagers in the United States vary greatly 
from state to state and by race and ethnicity but generally decreased 
between 2007 and 2015. In 2015, nationwide, about 229,715 females 
 
 6. See ANDREA SALTZMAN, DAVID M. FURMAN & KATHLEEN OHMAN, LAW IN SOCIAL 
WORK PRACTICE (3rd ed., 2016).  
 7. Forensic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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between the ages of 15 and 19 became pregnant.8 In 2010, approximately 
30 percent of pregnancies in girls age 15 to 19 ended in abortion.9 This is 
part of a general trend in declining teenage abortion rates. The majority of 
the pregnancies ended in live births (around 60 percent). Since 2004, 
individuals have become more likely to obtain abortions via medication 
rather than surgical methods.10 
 
B. THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF MINORS  
 
Parental consent. The U.S. Supreme Court has always been 
ambivalent about granting full constitutional rights to minors, who are not 
considered competent to make their own decisions in many areas.11 In a 
series of rulings between 1976 and 2006, the Court affirmed that minors do 
have a right to privacy in reproductive matters, but said their right is more 
limited than that of adults. 
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, the Court struck down 
a provision in Missouri law requiring that all unmarried women under 18 
obtain parental consent for an abortion.12 The Court said that the provision 
gave too much power to a third party (the parent) to veto the adolescent’s 
privacy right to decide on an abortion.13 However, in his opinion, Justice 
Blackmun (the author of Roe)14 acknowledged that the state might have a 
different interest in regulating the right of an immature minor than in 
regulating the right of an adult woman.15 The comment invited states to 
pass laws restricting the rights of minors. In subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court modified its original position, ruling that states could require parental 
consent, provided the minor could obtain permission for the procedure 
from a state court judge (a judicial bypass) without first going to her 
parents.16 
Parental notification. For a while, the Court distinguished between 
parental consent and parental notification statutes. Distinguishing between 
notification and consent implies that teens are essentially independent of 
their parent’s influence when it comes to making a decision. Yet, can an 
 
 8. See Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2015, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., 
Nov. 2017, at 1. 
 9. OFF. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., TRENDS IN TEEN PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEARING 
(2016). 
 10. HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FACT SHEET, MEDICATION ABORTION (June 
2018), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/medication-abortion/ [https://p 
erma.cc/TQ3V-BVPK]. 
 11. See MURRAY LEVINE ET AL., supra note 1, ch. 4. 
 12. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, (1976). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 15. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
 16. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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adolescent act independently when her parents are aware of the decision 
she wants to make? 
In H.L. v. Matheson (1981), Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the 
opinion upholding a statute requiring a physician to notify “if possible” the 
parents of girls under 15, living at home, and not emancipated.17 He 
reasoned that the state had a compelling interest in protecting immature and 
dependent minors and in preserving family integrity.18 Chief Justice Burger 
wrote that parental notification protected the child because the parents 
could supply medical information and history to the physician that the 
minor did not know.19 It did not matter if notice to the parent led to 
pressure on the girl to forgo the abortion because the state could elect 
policies to support childbirth rather than abortions, and notification was not 
the same as the veto involved in a statute requiring consent.20 
The chief justice saw no contradiction in the fact that, under most state 
laws, a pregnant minor can consent to medical procedures related to 
carrying a pregnancy and to childbirth. Citing some literature, he said 
abortion was different because: 
 
If the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term, the medical 
decisions to be made entail few—perhaps none—of the potentially 
grave emotional and psychological consequences of the decision to 
abort.21 
 
Melton and Pliner (1986) disputed whether the literature in fact supported 
that contention.22 
The H.L. v. Matheson (1981) opinion discussed the immature minor. 
How is maturity to be determined? The courts and legislatures accept 
simple chronological age as an adequate basis for determining competence 
to drive, to purchase alcohol, and to consent to sexual relations. In the 
abortion area, however, the Supreme Court refused to set a bright line of 
age, calling for a case-by-case determination of maturity.23 The Court again 
addressed the issue of determining maturity to obtain an abortion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (1983).24 In his opinion, Justice Lewis 
Powell listed the requirements for a valid parental notification or consent 
statute including the availability of a judicial bypass procedure: 
 
 17. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
 18. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 412-413. 
 22. See GARY B. MELTON & A. J. PLINER, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, 
in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (Gary B. Melton ed. 1986). 
 23. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 24. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 
(1983). 
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To protect her privacy right, the minor who does not wish to obtain 
parental consent or does not want her parents to know must be 
allowed to go to court directly.25 
 
Once in court, the minor must demonstrate to the judge that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the decision.26 If the minor demonstrates 
maturity, the judge will waive the provisions for parental notification or 
consent.27 Even if the judge finds the minor too immature to make the 
decision, the judge may authorize an abortion without parental notification 
or consent on the basis that this would be in the child’s best interests.28 
Justice Powell set out some factors for the court hearing the minor’s 
petition to consider: her emotional development, her maturity, her intellect 
and understanding, her understanding of the consequences of an abortion 
and of alternatives, and anything else the judge found pertinent to 
consider.29 These were vague, but they offered at least some minimum 
guidelines to judges and researchers. 
Two-parent versus one-parent notification. In Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a Minnesota law requiring 
that a minor notify both parents of her intent to have an abortion.30 The 
statute is another example of a state law designed to test the limits of 
restrictions on abortions. The legislature passed two versions of the bill, 
one version without a judicial bypass provision and another version with 
one. 
The American Psychological Association submitted an amicus curiae 
brief to the Supreme Court arguing that the two-parent notification statute 
had harmful effects on minors.31 The brief reviewed research showing that 
the two-parent notice requirement did not reestablish relationships with an 
estranged parent, and could result in threats to renew custody disputes. It 
could provoke violence or harassment in dysfunctional or abusive families. 
Some adolescents who might have notified one parent went to court only to 
avoid notifying the other one. The evidence at the trial opposing the 
implementation of the law supported the conclusion that the statute did not 
enhance communication with parents, and might well have impeded that 
goal. In addition, Minnesota state court judges who administered the law 
testified that they saw no good in it. The judges and other professionals 
 
 25. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 at 490. 
 26. Id. at 491. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 493. 
 30. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
 31. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Inc., & The 
Am. Jewish Comm. in Support of Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-1125). 
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who worked with adolescents told the initial trial court that the procedure 
was nerve-wracking for youth, and stimulated feelings of anger, shame, 
guilt, and embarrassment. 
The Supreme Court was deeply divided. Justice John Paul Stevens 
wrote for a five-justice majority finding the two-parent notice without 
judicial bypass unconstitutional.32 A different five-justice majority agreed 
that the statute including a judicial bypass provision was constitutional.33 
(Justice O’Connor provided the fifth vote each time.) 34 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion upholding the two-parent 
notification and 48-hour delay provisions with judicial bypass.35 Justice 
Kennedy was unimpressed with the empirical evidence. In his view, the 
values embodied in the statute were more important than assessing 
empirically whether the statute was achieving its goal. He saw the 
Minnesota law as a permissible, reasoned attempt to further the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting minors and protecting the parental role 
without placing an absolute obstacle to abortion in an adolescent’s way. 
Imperfections in the application of statutes are inevitable, he said. The 
Court should defer to the state legislature’s wisdom in supporting a 
“tradition of a parental role in the care and upbringing of children that is as 
old as civilization itself.”36 Justice Kennedy reflected the opinion of a 
strong majority of Americans who, in public opinion polls, support laws 
requiring teenagers to obtain parental consent or notification before 
obtaining an abortion.37 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was in the first five-justice majority, 
entered a vigorous dissent to any two-parent notification provision, with or 
without bypass.38 In support of his position, Justice Marshall cited research 
findings extensively, including the APA brief and articles by Gary Melton 
and by Catherine Lewis published in the American Psychologist.39 
In 2006, the Supreme Court reviewed a law requiring that 48 hours 
pass after parental notification before an abortion could take place.40 The 
Court overturned the law as it lacked a medical emergency exception for 
the woman’s health.41 In ruling, however, the Court quietly raised a 
potential tension. Elsewhere in the textbook, we discuss research cited by 
 
 32. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 501. 
 37. Margaret Carlson, Abortion’s Hardest Cases, TIME, July 9, 1990 at 22. 
 38. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417. 
   39.  See Gary Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 79 (1987); see also Catherine Lewis, Minors’ Competence to Consent to 
Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 84 (1987). 
 40. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
 41. Id. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 5/28/2019  11:30 AM 
Summer 2019] SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 249 
the APA in other amicus briefs (that the Supreme Court endorsed) finding 
that adolescents are impulsive and, as such, should not be subjected to the 
death penalty.42 Citing that research, the Ayotte Court thus stated that 
parental notification laws are still important to help adolescents make 
informed decisions.43 However, many people might argue that the research 
in the APA brief seemed to contradict the Hodgson APA research that 
minors can make competent decisions.44 Without explicitly noting it, the 
Court raised an important question: How can the law and research reconcile 
when children and adolescents can make good decisions and when do they 
make bad decisions? And, can a coherent policy be formed around such 
research studies? In this next section, we attempt to review some of this 
research and at least pose the questions. 
 
III. RESEARCH ISSUES RAISED BY THE COURT DECISIONS 
 
Laws regulating adolescent access to abortion have sometimes played 
out in unexpected ways. How adolescents make decisions; how family 
members, judges, and lawyers who may represent adolescents in hearings 
respond; and the availability of abortion services determine what the laws 
mean in action. 
 
A. MINORS’ COMPETENCE TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT ABORTION  
 
Consent to health care must be informed; that is, the patient must have 
“received adequate information about the risks associated with the 
particular treatment and the alternatives that might be selected in place of 
it.”45 The patient receiving the information must be able to use it 
intelligently, to understand the information, and to draw inferences about 
the probable implications of any proposed treatment for his or her future. 
The law presumes that adults are competent to make decisions about 
medical care, but that minors are not. In theory, giving the parent the 
authority to consent for the minor helps make up for what the minor lacks 
in experience, emotional maturity, or the ability to make a complex 
judgment. The states recognize that many older minors do have the 
competence to give consent to treatment in some areas. Many states also 
recognize that minors may not seek treatment or may delay treatment for 
conditions that, if known to the parents, might result in family conflict. 
 
 42. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 1. 
 43. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 320. 
 44. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ 
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009). 
 45. WALTER J. WADLINGTON, Consent to Medical Care for Minors: The Legal 
Framework, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCY TO CONSENT 57, 64 (G. B. Melton, G. P. Koocher, 
& M. J. Saks eds., 1983). 
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Depending on state law, minors under age 18 may seek treatment without 
parental consent for substance abuse or addiction, family planning, 
pregnancy care, venereal disease, and, sometimes, psychotherapy or 
counseling.  The question is when can adolescents competently make such 
decisions. 
Research on adolescent decision-making. Research suggests that 
young people 15 and older are fairly competent cognitively to make general 
health care decisions. They respond to questions about health care 
dilemmas and use information in a manner not too different from adults.46 
Ambuel and Rappaport studied adolescents who came to a woman’s 
medical clinic for a pregnancy test.47 They found that minors under 15, 
compared to older minors, were on average less able to answer questions 
about the advantages and disadvantages of an abortion or of parenthood, 
and about how a pregnancy or abortion might affect others in their lives.48 
Minors over 15 had about the same knowledge and information as those 
over 18.49 Ehrlich studied adolescents who had sought judicial bypasses.50 
She reported that adolescents as young as 14 had fairly well thought 
through, reasons for their choice and that most could state several cogent 
reasons for seeking an abortion.51 
Indeed, in a 2009 analysis, Steinberg and colleagues reconciled the 
differences between decisions on adolescent criminal impulsivity and the 
ability to make rational and informed medical choices.52 There they noted 
that adolescents’ cognitive abilities generally reached an adult-level around 
the age of 15 but that their psychosocial skills continued to develop 
throughout adolescence and perhaps into early adulthood.53 Thus, the 
scientists argued that medical decisions are different from the choice to 
commit crime as the former is (though highly emotional) often made with 
time allotted to think and frequently in conjunction with another adult 
(even if not a parent).54 Under these circumstances, most adolescents are 
arguably able to make adult-like decisions.   
That being said, teens have unrealistic expectations about how their 
 
 46. See Catherine C Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over 
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538 (1981); see also Lois 
A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make 
Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982). 
 47. See B. Ambuel & J. Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological 
and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 129 (1992). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Choosing Abortion: Teens Who Make the Decision Without 
Parental Involvement, GENDER ISSUES, Mar. 2003, at 3, 3. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Steinberg et al., supra note 44. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Laurence Steinberg & Dustin Albert, Judgment and Decision Making in 
Adolescence, 21 J. OF RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211 (2011).  
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lives would be affected by carrying a child to term. Ninety-four percent 
believe they could stay in school if they became pregnant, but only 70 
percent of pregnant teens actually do stay.55 Fifty-one percent believe they 
would marry the father of the child, but 81 percent of teen mothers are 
unmarried.56 
Examining the Research: Adolescent Decision-Making. Throughout 
this book, we have looked at the research on adolescents’ abilities to make 
careful decisions. In 2016, Cohen and an impressive group of colleagues 
considered decisions made by 110 participants varying in age from 13 to 
25.57 These decisions were made under either positive, negative, or neutral 
emotional contexts.58   
Younger adults revealed differences in their cognitive control from 
older adults but only when they were negatively aroused.59 No such 
differences were found in the positive or neutral conditions.60 This argues 
for interventions that provide adolescents with support to ensure that they 
are able to make choices without increased current stress or arousal. 
Controversy about the use of research. Many psychologists have 
debated the correct use of the research regarding adolescent competence 
and decision-making. Is the research settled or clear enough to usefully 
inform the courts and legislatures? Or, instead, are the scientists using their 
research to motivate their desired policy outcomes? There are large risks in 
the ways that science is perceived. Indeed, as noted by Steinberg and his 
colleagues: 
 
If APA’s statements about the state of scientific knowledge are 
seen as advocacy masquerading as research, the integrity of the 
Association’s scientific mission is threatened.61 
 
The debate regarding whether the science is ready has been ongoing for 
some time. In the early 1980s, some psychologists argued that, based on 
intellectual competence alone as demonstrated in developmental studies, there 
was little basis for limiting the right of older adolescents to participate in 
medical decisions.62 They maintain that the research, though imperfect, was 
 
 55. SIECUS REP., Feb.-Mar. 2002, at 1, 1.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive 
Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549, 550 (2016). 
 58. Id. at 551. 
 59. Id. at 557. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Steinberg et al., supra note 45, at 583. 
 62. See Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy 
as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983); Gary B. Melton, 
Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. OF FAM. L. 445 (1984); 
Gary B. Melton & Nancy F. Russo, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological Perspectives on 
Public Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 69 (1987).  
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well enough developed to provide useful information to judges who need to 
make immediate decisions in the cases before them.63 The APA agreed with 
this position and presented the work in amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme 
Court in Hartigan v. Zbaraz and Charles, Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and Hodgson v. Minnesota.64 
Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, however, believed that the APA’s use of 
the studies on adolescent competence in a legal forum was inappropriate.65 
They argued that the research was too sparse, the methods oversimplified, 
and the conclusions not well enough accepted in the scientific community 
to warrant confident assertions in a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court.66 The 
debate thus still continues about when the database is sufficient to warrant 
an amicus brief and when it is sufficient to support a policy preference. 
When and how do we decide the science is ready for judges and legislators 
to rely upon it with confidence? 
 
B. EFFECTS OF PARENTAL NOTIFICATION AND CONSENT STATUTES 
 
Parental notification or consent statutes are intended to protect the 
minor from unwise decisions, and to promote the integrity of the family 
and the authority of the parent. No law prohibits adolescents from 
informing their parents. The laws permit adolescents to avoid notifying 
parents if the adolescent so chooses by going to court. The statutes present 
an important opportunity to see how a law shapes human behavior, and 
how people adapt to a law when vital interests are at stake. 
Did adolescents notify parents before they had to? Clary studied 141 
adolescents who had requested abortion services at a clinic in the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area in 1979, before Minnesota implemented its law 
requiring parental notification.67 Most studies found that around half of 
minors voluntarily involved one or both of their parents, even if the 
hospital or abortion clinic had no policy requiring parental consent or 
notification.68 Younger minors, perhaps because of greater financial and 
emotional dependence, were more likely to inform their parents than older 
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minors.69 
Smith found that most adolescents who confided in their parents felt 
the experience increased communication and brought them closer 
together.70 However, those who expected their parents would have a 
negative reaction were less likely to inform them of the pregnancy in the 
first place.71 About a third of those who did not tell their parents believed 
that, if they had, their parents would have punished them or prevented them 
from having the abortion Some young women said they feared upsetting 
their parents or making them feel bad.72  
After parental notification: Advise, consent, or coerce. Ehrlich 
found that adolescents under 18 who sought judicial waivers under the law 
in Massachusetts expressed many of the same concerns as adolescents prior 
to notification laws being enacted (that parents would try to convince them 
not to obtain the procedure).73 In addition to concerns about physical abuse, 
many feared their parents would lose respect for them or lose trust.74 Many 
who sought the waivers said that they had had little communication with 
their parents about sex and that communication now would be very 
difficult.75  
Adolescents who want an abortion and fear their parents will oppose 
their wishes can try to obtain the abortion by getting court permission or by 
seeking the abortion in another state without parental notification or 
consent laws. If the state’s consent or notification law is to be upheld as 
constitutional, adolescents must have the option of seeking a court waiver 
without notifying their parents. Adolescents who want to have the baby do 
not need their parents’ permission under the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings.  
With whom do adolescents consult? Almost half of adolescents who 
wish to obtain an abortion notify an adult who is neither their parent nor a 
medical professional.76 Adolescents are also likely to share problems with 
friends than with parents or professionals.77 Seventy-one percent of 
adolescents seeking an abortion in Cartoof and Klerman’s sample told their 
best friend, and about 90 percent told their boyfriends.78 Ehrlich reported 
similar findings based on a large sample of adolescents who sought a 
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judicial bypass waiver in Massachusetts.79 
We do not know exactly what teenage friends have to offer by way of 
sage counsel or practical advice to a pregnant adolescent.80 Research has 
shown that the presence of peers can induce adolescents to make more 
risky decisions.81 However, most of this research has focused on emotional 
or impulsive decisions, which, as we discussed earlier, have been argued to 
be different for adolescents than situations where cognition is the driving 
factor. 
 
C. HOW ADOLESCENTS ADAPT TO THE LAW 
 
Researchers have investigated the effects of parental notification laws 
in Massachusetts and Minnesota, and there are some data from other states 
as well. 
The judicial bypass option. Before parental notification or consent 
laws took effect, 33 percent to 50 percent of minors seeking an abortion 
informed their parents.82 Mnookin estimated that, after Massachusetts 
instituted a parental consent requirement with judicial bypass in 1981, 
about 75 percent of minors seeking abortions in the state obtained parental 
consent, and about 25 percent sought judicial bypass.83 However, a 
significant number of young women obtained abortions in neighboring 
states without those restrictions to avoid both the consent provision and a 
court hearing.84 If we take into account adolescents who went out of state, 
after the law went into effect, only about 42 percent of Massachusetts 
minors getting abortions were notifying their parents. 
Blum, Resnick, and Stark studied the impact of the Minnesota law that 
required minors to notify both parents or seek a judicial bypass.85 They 
concluded that the law probably resulted in more adolescents telling their 
parents about their pregnancy.86 However, about 43 percent of minors 
seeking abortions used the court bypass.87 About a quarter of these minors 
had notified one parent, but did not want to notify the other.88 Most of the 
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group that went to court was over 16 (85 percent), and the majority came 
from economically better-off families.89 
The judicial waiver provisions of state laws on parental notification or 
consent, a constitutional requirement, provide good examples of the 
difference between the law on the books and the law in action.90 In 
Massachusetts, the judicial waiver worked reasonably smoothly, although 
the adolescents who went through the procedure found it stressful and 
embarrassing.91 Other states also have such laws, but the mechanics were 
such that there were obstacles to using the court, especially if the judge 
reviewing the petition personally opposed abortion.92 
Silverstein et al. studied how well the Tennessee parental consent law 
operated. In theory, the law had several provisions that should make it 
easier for adolescents to access the judicial bypass option (e.g., a state-
supported advocate, court-appointed counsel to assist the adolescent, and 
courts with jurisdiction conveniently located in each county). The research 
team called each county’s court, saying, “I am calling to find out how a girl 
who is not eighteen who wants an abortion can get a judge’s permission to 
avoid telling her parents.”93 
If the respondent in the court referred the caller to someone else, the 
research team pursued that call to see where it led. The research team 
measured “preparedness” by noting whether or not the court personnel 
acknowledged their obligation to conduct waiver hearings and mentioned 
the availability of legal counsel or an advocate. Based on the telephone 
inquiry, they classified 45 of Tennessee’s 95 county courts (47 percent) as 
being unprepared to handle inquiries. Many of the courts simply 
recommended contacting an attorney, a social service agency, or an 
abortion clinic. Eight informants in the 45 unprepared courts expressed 
doubts that a judge could waive parental consent, although state law 
explicitly gives judges that authority.94 
Most of the court advocates designated by the Department of Social 
Services to work with minors on the petitions were prepared to do so. 
However, it took repeated telephone calls to contact many of the advocates. 
Adolescents would not or could not leave home numbers to receive 
callbacks from advocates. They feared their parents would learn what they 
wanted to do. For many adolescents, these administrative flaws made the 
waiver procedure accessible only with difficulty. Similar problems were 
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reported in Alabama and Pennsylvania.95 
What happens when adolescents go to court? In those states for 
which we have data, judges almost never reject the petitions of minors 
seeking abortions. From 1981 to 1983, about 1,300 Massachusetts minors 
sought judicial authorization for an abortion. The hearings were short. The 
judges found the minor was “mature” in about 90 percent of the cases. 
When the minor was not mature, the judge was required to consider her 
“best interests.” The Massachusetts judges found that an abortion was in 
the minor’s best interests in all but five cases. All five managed to obtain 
abortions, one by going to another judge, three through an appeal, and one 
by going out of state.96 Ehrlich, working with Massachusetts adolescents in 
subsequent years, reported similar rates of judges allowing minors to obtain 
abortions. Though judges in Massachusetts almost always granted the 
petition, the young women who went to court experienced it as aversive 
and punitive.97 Many were embarrassed and angered by the experience. 
Going to court in and of itself invaded adolescent privacy.98 Judges asked 
the young women intimate questions about their sex lives, their menstrual 
cycles (to determine how advanced the pregnancy was), about abortions, 
about how they made their decision, and sometimes about their relationship 
with their parents.99 Young petitioners were also afraid they might see 
someone they knew in the courthouse building.100 
In Minnesota, petitions were usually granted after a hearing lasting an 
average of 15 minutes (see Justice Marshall’s dissent in Hodgson v. 
Minnesota). However, the judicial bypass procedure was burdensome.101 In 
addition to delays arising from court schedules, judges who had 
conscientious objections to abortion refused to hear the petitions.102 Minors 
sometimes had to travel as much as 500 miles to get a hearing.103 
Undertaking a journey of that distance in itself sometimes compromised a 
teenager’s privacy.104 None of the groups involved in judicial bypass 
thought the procedure was satisfactory.105 The young women who went to 
court were angry and resentful at having to report intimate details of their 
lives to strangers, and many reported feeling anxious and guilty in court as 
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well.106 Judges did not see the point of the proceeding; if the young woman 
was mature, she could have an abortion as she wished.107 If they found that 
she was not mature enough to make her own decision, how could they 
decide she was mature enough to bear a child? Lawyers assigned to aid the 
petitioning minors also disliked the task.108 They received no fee or were 
paid low fees by the state and not very promptly.109 
While judges in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Michigan tend to 
rubber-stamp petitions by minors, this may not be the case in other states. 
There are very little systematic data for other states. When judicial 
approval of petitions is more difficult to obtain, one can hypothesize that 
more pregnant minors will inform their parents or go out of the state if they 
can to avoid the requirement. Virginia’s bypass statute gives the judge 
discretion to inform the adolescent’s parent or parents. There are no data on 
the effect of this Virginia law. The District of Columbia, which borders 
Virginia, has no parental consent or notification law. However, the District 
of Columbia has the highest number of teenage abortions in the country. 
Some of the adolescents who had abortions in the District of Columbia 
came from neighboring Virginia. In Texas, adolescents advised by lawyers 
or counselors may go “judge shopping.”110 For example, two counties with 
judges with anti-abortion reputations had 19 and 13 cases respectively.111 
Two adjacent counties handled 191 and 110 cases respectively.112 
Delay in seeking abortion. Abortions are riskier and more costly as a 
pregnancy progresses. Because the period between the first suspicions that 
they are pregnant and the decision about what to do is the most stressful for 
women, delay also increases stress and anxiety. Most abortions take place 
within the first 12 weeks of gestation. However, adolescents, especially 
younger ones, more than older women, delay seeking an abortion. Concern 
about their parents’ reactions and reluctance to go to court may be among 
the reasons adolescents delay seeking an abortion, to their detriment. In 
Texas, following a parental notification law, fewer minors became 
pregnant, but minors who were pregnant and were within six months of 
reaching their eighteenth birthday showed an increased likelihood of 
obtaining a delayed (and more complicated) second trimester abortion.113 
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There seems to be a general trend to delay seeking an abortion among 
women in those states with laws that require a waiting period or a return for 
a second consultation, as approved in Casey.114 In Mississippi, the 
proportion of second-trimester abortions increased from 7.5 percent of 
abortions to 11.5 percent among women who relied on providers within the 
state.115 The rate increased somewhat less among those able to seek 
abortions in nearby states that did not have a law requiring delay.116 
Does parental notification reduce the number of abortions? Pro-life 
advocates hoped that parental notification and consent statutes would 
reduce the number of abortions, but the law did not appear to have that 
effect in Massachusetts.117 Cartoof and Klerman (1986) used the 
Massachusetts Department of Health database to examine changes month 
by month in the number of adolescents who obtained abortions within the 
state, and also obtained data on the number of minors who obtained 
abortions in five neighboring states that at that time did not have parental 
consent or notification requirements.118 The number of women under 17 
having abortions in Massachusetts went down about 43 percent the year the 
notification requirement was implemented.119 However, the number of 
Massachusetts minors seeking abortions in neighboring states went from an 
average of 29 a month to an average of 95 a month.120 The researchers 
concluded that the law had done very little, if anything, to reduce the 
number of abortions among Massachusetts adolescents.121 In Texas, the 
number of abortions obtained by teenagers did decline following passage of 
a parental notification law, but it is difficult to attribute the decline to the 
operation of the law alone.122 The number of abortions has been declining 
nationally for several years now; some believe that it is due to increased 
access to healthcare and/or increased education rather than restrictions on 




Adolescents’ ability to make informed medical decisions for 
themselves is an area of both empirical and legal debate. Perhaps no other 
medical decision has been more litigated than the right of adolescents to 
decide to have an abortion. For most of our nation’s history, abortion was 
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the province of state governments. In the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court developed a constitutional right to privacy that it extended first to the 
use of contraception and then, in Roe v. Wade, to abortion.123 By making 
the right to get an abortion part of a constitutionally protected right to 
privacy in reproductive matters, the decision limited the power of the states 
to prohibit abortion. After Roe v. Wade, a growing right-to-life movement 
worked toward the passage of state laws regulating abortion in ways that 
would be likely to discourage women from terminating their pregnancies. 
Some of the restrictions survived challenges brought to the Supreme Court, 
but the Court refused to overturn the basic ruling that abortion could not be 
banned.124 
The abortion story is far from over, and social science and 
psychological studies will continue to play a part in the debate. The social 
science community will be divided about when the research base is 
sufficiently strong to be a basis for policy recommendations. For example, 
more work is needed to reconcile the research showing that adolescents are 
more likely to make risky choices than adults with research showing that 
adolescents can make rational and capable decisions. The one thing of 
which we can be confident is that activists of all points of view will use 
social science and psychological studies to try to persuade the public to 
support their causes. As a result, research may well have both direct and 
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